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Introduction
Analysts of Korean politics have tended to present two different, and to some 
extent conﬂ icting, interpretations regarding what really caused South Korea’s 
recent democratization since 1987. According to one popular interpretation, it was 
primarily – if not entirely – due to a series of elite calculations and interactions.1 
The focus of this interpretation is June 29, 1987 on which the chairman of the 
ruling Democratic Justice Party, Roh Tae Woo, made his eight-point proposal 
on democratic reform – the “June 29 Declaration.” It is still disputable if there 
existed a real split between the “hardliners” and the “softliners” within the ruling 
elite.2 Nevertheless, according to this interpretation, ruling elites predicted that 
the opposition would be fragmented, and this is why they agreed to adopt a set of 
democratic reforms including a change to a direct presidential election system.
The other interpretation, which I support and develop in this chapter, puts 
emphasis on mass mobilization by civil society groups. The central event, 
according to this interpretation, is not Roh Tae Woo’s June 29 Declaration but a 
series of nationwide anti-government protest demonstrations from approximately 
June 10 to June 29, 1987 – the “June Popular Uprising.” This approach in essence 
argues that what was crucial for the democratic transition in South Korea in 1987 
was the formation of a pro-democracy coalition and an unprecedented level of 
mass mobilization, which eventually pressured the ruling authoritarian regime to 
accommodate popular demand for democratic reform.3
These two different interpretations of South Korean democratization closely 
mirror the two dominant paradigms in the existing literature on democratic 
transition and consolidation. On the one hand, there is an elite-centered paradigm, 
emphasizing elite strategies and interactions. According to this paradigm, “elite 
dispositions, calculations, and pacts … largely determine whether or not an 
opening will occur at all.”4 On the other hand, there is a mass-centered paradigm, 
accentuating mass mobilization and civil society.5 According to this paradigm, 
the choices that civil society groups and mass publics make induce elites to move 
towards democracy. In general, the elite-centered paradigm is more applicable 
to “pacted” transitions, whereas the mass-centered paradigm better explains 
“reformist” or “revolutionary” transitions.6 In other words, the relative importance 
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of elite vs. mass factors depends, at least in theory, on the speciﬁ c case and its 
mode of transition. In practice, however, most cases present mixed pictures. For 
instance, even with regard to the Spanish case, which is considered to be a classic 
example of a pacted transition, the two interpretations are still competing and 
clashing.7 Therefore, the debate on elites vs. masses is far from being settled.
The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that the mass-centered 
approach, i.e., the “June Popular Uprising” interpretation, is a more appropriate 
explanation for the case of South Korean democratization. The mobilization of 
civil society was extremely important in South Korea’s democratic transition. 
Furthermore, I argue that civil society has been crucial in the politics of democratic 
consolidation of South Korea too. In the course of this analysis, I ﬁ rst examine the 
role of civil society groups in the democratic transition during 1984–87. Next, I 
analyze the role of civil society groups in the politics of democratic consolidation 
since 1988 to the present. I then conclude with a few theoretical reﬂ ections on the 
debate about elites vs. masses and on the implications of active civil society for 
further democratic consolidation in South Korea.
Civil society and the democratic transition, 1984–87
Severe state repression of civil society characterized the ﬁ rst four years (1980–
83) of the Chun Doo Hwan regime. Following the violent suppression of the 
pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 1980, the authoritarian regime 
implemented a series of coercive campaigns to “cleanse (chŏnghwa)” the entire 
society, purging or arresting thousands of public ofﬁ cials, politicians, professors, 
teachers, pastors, journalists, and students on various charges of corruption, 
instigation, and organization of anti-government demonstrations, and attempts 
at insurrection. Meanwhile, a legislature pro tempore, the Legislative Council 
for National Security passed numerous anti-democratic laws, curtailing political 
competition, restricting basic democratic freedoms, establishing an elaborate 
system of press censorship, and suppressing the labor movement.
Starting in late 1983, however, Chun’s suppression of civil society signiﬁ c-
antly abated. The authoritarian regime decided to liberalize the polity, allowing 
anti-government university professors and students to return to their schools, 
withdrawing the military police from university campuses, pardoning or 
rehabilitating political prisoners, and lifting the ban on political activities of 
hundreds of former politicians. What the government intended through these 
liberalization measures was to make the ruling Democratic Justice Party popular 
and therefore electorally competitive. The consequence of the liberalization, 
however, was quite different from what the regime expected –  it resulted, in 
fact, in “the resurrection of civil society.”8 Various groups in South Korean civil 
society, particularly those movement groups which had been decimated by the 
authoritarian regime’s severe repression between 1980 and 1983, were rapidly 
resurrected.
First of all, in February and March of 1984, university students, who had just 
returned to their campuses for the new academic year, restored and reorganized 
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anti-government student groups. In November 1984 students from 42 universities 
and colleges organized the National Student Coalition for Democracy Struggle 
(Chŏnhangnyŏn). This was the ﬁ rst nationwide student organization since the 
April Student Uprising that led to the downfall of the Syngman Rhee regime in 
1960.
 Second, the Korean Council for Labor Welfare (KCLW, Han’guk nohyŏp) was 
organized in March 1984. Composed of various labor unions that had spearheaded 
anti-Yusin pro-democracy struggles in the 1970s, the KCLW tried to restore and 
strengthen unity and solidarity among labor movement groups. In April 1984 the 
Chŏnggye apparel labor union, which had been prominent in the labor movement 
in the 1970s but was dissolved by the authoritarian regime in 1981, was also 
restored. The KCLW and Chŏnggye jointly launched a massive campaign against 
the arbitrary labor laws enacted by the Legislative Council for National Security. 
The old student–labor alliance was resurrected, and students actively supported 
and cooperated with the restored labor unions. In addition, church groups such 
as the National Catholic Priests’ Corps for the Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ, 
K’atollik chŏngŭi kuhyŏn chŏn’guk sajedan) assisted the labor movement, waging 
a signature campaign for the revision of objectionable labor laws.
Third, and most importantly, the resurrected student groups, youth organizations, 
labor unions, religious organizations, and other civil society groups were united 
and coordinated under the uniﬁ ed leadership of a national umbrella organization, 
the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reuniﬁ cation (PMCDR, 
Mint’ongnyŏn). The PMCDR, established in March 1985, encompassed not only 
urban labor, landless peasants, and leading intellectuals, but also most of the 
country’s Buddhist, Protestant, and Roman Catholic clergy and lay groups.9 Unlike 
numerous national movement associations during the 1970s, this organization 
was not just a group of dissident dignitaries but was quite reﬂ ective of the alliance 
of students, laborers, and religious leaders.
While various pro-democracy movement groups re-emerged in civil society, 
a genuine opposition re-emerged in political society.10 Between 1980 and 1983 
there was no real opposition in South Korean politics. Opposition parties such 
as the Democratic Korea Party (Minhandang) and Korean Nationalist Party 
(Kungmindang), created and controlled by the authoritarian regime, had been 
unable and unwilling to criticize and challenge the political legitimacy of the 
regime. What the authoritarian regime expected in implementing a series of 
liberalization measures in 1983–84 was the further fragmentation of the opposition. 
Contrary to the regime’s expectations, however, liberalization resulted in the 
dramatic resuscitation and expansion of a real opposition. Many of the reinstated 
opposition politicians formed the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP, Sinhan 
minjudang) in January 1985, immediately before the National Assembly elections 
in February.
The politics of authoritarian breakdown and democratic transition began 
in earnest with the formation of the NKDP and its electoral alignment with 
civil society groups. Many civil society groups, particularly youth and student 
organizations, openly supported and vigorously campaigned for the NKDP. 
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It was the ﬁ rst time since the early 1960s that university students supported a 
particular political party. The turnout in the National Assembly elections on 
February 12, 1985 was 84.6 percent, which was the highest since the 1950s. The 
NKDP emerged as the leading opposition, unexpectedly winning 29.26 percent of 
the votes, compared with 35.25 percent for the ruling Democratic Justice Party. 
After the elections, the strategy of the civil society groups and the NKDP was to 
make the legitimacy question the only and the most important political issue.11 
The coalition between civil society groups and the opposition NKDP outlived the 
National Assembly elections and later developed into a grand democracy coalition 
against the authoritarian regime.
Pro-democracy activities by civil society groups in South Korea during 
1986–87 primarily took three different forms. First, starting in early 1986, 
religious activists issued a series of declarations and statements reprimanding 
the authoritarian regime and demanding an immediate constitutional revision. 
For instance, Protestant pastors argued in a statement in March 1986 that a 
new constitution, which would include a direct presidential election system and 
address basic human rights and economic equality, should be drafted immediately, 
and the next government should be elected according to the new constitution. 
Cardinal Kim Su Hwan declared in early March 1986 that “Democratization is 
the best way to make peace with God. The sooner the constitutional revision, the 
better.”12 Moreover, beginning with a statement by professors at Korea University 
on March 28, 1986, 783 professors at 29 colleges and universities nationwide 
publicly announced “statements on the current situation (Siguk sŏnŏn),” which 
was an organized and peaceful nonconﬁ dence campaign against the authoritarian 
regime.
Second, the opposition NKDP launched a popular campaign to collect ten 
million signatures nationwide in support of constitutional revision. The number 
– ten million – was almost half of the electorate and a quarter of the entire 
population of South Korea at the time. The campaign started on February 12, 
1986, the ﬁ rst anniversary of the 1985 National Assembly elections, and rapidly 
spread across the country. The “size and ferocity” of the signature drive astonished 
the authoritarian regime.13 The police carried out a series of harsh crackdowns on 
the signature campaign by raiding the NKDP headquarters and the ofﬁ ces of civil 
society groups and arresting numerous campaign activists. But the regime could 
not stem the tide of the campaign.
Third, concurrently with the signature campaign, civil society groups and 
the NKDP jointly sponsored and held a number of mass rallies in support 
of democratization. The People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and 
Reuniﬁ cation and the NKDP set up the National Coalition for Democracy 
Movement (Min’gungnyŏn) and coordinated, organized, mobilized, and led mass 
rallies in major cities of the country – Kwangju on March 30, Chŏngju on April 4, 
Taegu on April 5, Taejŏn on April 19, Inch’ŏn on May 3, Masan on May 10, and 
Chŏnju on May 31. Civil society groups and the opposition party were particularly 
encouraged by the “February Revolution” in the Philippines in which the Marcos 
regime was at last expelled by the “people’s power.” The number of participants 
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in these mass rallies exceeded 700,000 in total. Such a level of mass mobilization, 
except during election campaigns, was the highest since the April Uprising in 
1960. The grand democracy coalition of civil society groups and the opposition 
party succeeded in mobilizing South Koreans from all walks of life – students, 
workers, peasants, urban service industry employees, religious leaders, and other 
citizens – under the banner of “Down with the Military Authoritarian Regime and 
Up with a Democratic Government.”
Two events were particularly instrumental in bolstering the power of the pro-
democracy coalition and maintaining the high level of mass mobilization. First, 
at the dawn of 1987, Pak Chong Ch’ŏl, a Seoul National University student, was 
tortured to death during a police interrogation. The police initially announced that 
Pak had died of a heart attack. On May 18, however, the National Catholic Priests’ 
Corps for the Realization of Justice (NCPCRJ) disclosed that Pak died of police 
torture and that the police and the regime had attempted to conceal the fact. Pak 
Chong Ch’ŏl’s torture death and the revelation of the regime’s conspiracy to cover 
up the crime put the authoritarian regime and the ruling party on the defensive and 
dramatically augmented the position and power of the pro-democracy coalition.
Second, Chun Doo Hwan declared on April 13, 1987 that he could no longer 
tolerate wasteful discussions on constitutional revision. This unilateral decision 
to terminate the public discussions on constitutional revision intensiﬁ ed mass 
mobilization. University professors initiated a public statement campaign, 
criticizing and opposing Chun’s decision. Artists, novelists, writers, and actors 
followed suit. Religious leaders and priests waged a series of hunger strikes. 
Cardinal Kim Su Hwan and many religious organizations including the NCPCRJ, 
the National Council of Protestant Pastors for Justice and Peace, and the Korean 
Christian Council (Han’guk kidokkyo hyŏbŭihoe) also expressed their strong 
opposition to the decision. Violent anti-government protests by students, labor 
unions, and other civil society groups spread across the country, and tens of 
thousands of South Koreans in major cities demonstrated against the decision.
In May 1987 civil society groups established the National Movement Head-
quarter for Democratic Constitution (NMHDC, Kungmin undong ponbu). This 
organization, consisting of the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy 
and Reuniﬁ cation and 25 other major civil society groups, covered all major 
sectoral groups and geographical areas. Organizing and coordinating local 
branches throughout the country, the NMHDC mobilized a series of massive pro-
democracy demonstrations against the authoritarian regime in June 1987. The 
mobilization escalated particularly after Yi Han Yŏl, a Yonsei University student, 
was hit by tear gas bomb fragments on June 9 and critically injured. On June 10 
the NMHDC organized the “Uprising Rally to Defeat the April 13 Decision and 
to End Dictatorship”. On June 26 it held the “Peace Parade” in which one million 
people participated nationwide. Not only the pro-democracy movement groups 
but also many middle-class citizens participated in these mass rallies. Pak Chong 
Ch’ŏl’s torture death and Yi Han Yŏl’s injury (and later death) particularly angered 
middle-class citizens, because these two incidents most vividly demonstrated the 
immoral, illegitimate, violent, and repressive nature of the authoritarian regime. 
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Just like the death of high school student Kim Chu Yŏl in 1960 and the death 
of a female labor striker, Kim Kyŏng Suk, in 1979, the deaths of Pak Chong 
Ch’ŏl and Yi Han Yŏl brought to the minds of ordinary citizens the image of 
“democratic martyr,” which has been a recurrent theme in the checkered history 
of South Korean democratization.
Confronted with unprecedented mass protests and mobilization, on June 29, 
1987, the authoritarian regime ﬁ nally announced dramatic and unexpected 
concessions to the demands of civil society groups and the opposition party, 
adopting a direct presidential election system.
Civil society and the democratic consolidation, 1988–
Perhaps ironically, the presidential elections in 1987 – the result of intense popular 
pressure – left civil society in South Korea marginalized and fragmented. First, 
once the authoritarian regime agreed to carry out a set of democratic reforms 
including direct presidential elections, the focus of the transitional politics rapidly 
shifted to the “founding elections” – the presidential elections in December 1987 
and the National Assembly elections in April 1988. As the founding elections 
were nearing, South Korean politics increasingly revolved around party politics 
and electoral competitions in political society. Civil society and mass mobilization 
became incrementally marginal. Second, after trying in vain to remedy the fatal 
split between the two opposition leaders, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, 
civil society groups took different positions on whom to support for the upcoming 
presidential elections. When the presidential elections ended with the ruling 
party’s victory, civil society groups were left deeply fragmented as a result.
However, after the inauguration of Roh Tae Woo, civil society groups 
remobilized themselves and resumed their pro-democracy campaign with a vigor 
comparable to or even stronger than that during the 1985–87 period. One of the 
most important reasons why civil society groups could resume their movement for 
democratic reform relatively quickly was the continuity of the Roh regime with 
the previous authoritarian regime. Roh himself did not appear to represent a clear 
break with the past. He could be seen as just another general-turned-president. 
Being a close friend of Chun Doo Hwan and deeply involved in the military coup 
of 1979–80 and the subsequent consolidation of the authoritarian political system, 
Roh had been groomed and eventually anointed as an ofﬁ cial successor to Chun 
until the last minute, when the ruling bloc decided to yield to popular pressure 
by proclaiming the June 29 democratization package. Roh was the greatest 
beneﬁ ciary of the past authoritarian regime and therefore extremely constrained 
in terms of what he could do regarding the liquidation of the authoritarian past. To 
most of the movement groups that had led the “June Uprising” in 1987, the Roh 
regime was viewed as a mere extension of authoritarian rule. Thus civil society 
groups often pejoratively characterized Roh as “Chun with a wig,” likening him 
to the previous military ruler who was bald. At best, Roh’s regime seemed to be 
a liberalized authoritarianism (dictablanda), and the need to continue the pro-
democracy struggle appeared vital.14
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Furthermore, the grand party merger in 1990 offered glaring evidence that the 
Roh Tae Woo regime was just a continuation of the past authoritarianism and 
the opposition parties were unreliable. In early 1990, Roh – who, as leader of a 
minority party, had been seriously concerned about his political vulnerability in 
the National Assembly since his inauguration – succeeded in merging his ruling 
Democratic Justice Party with two opposition parties: the Uniﬁ cation Democratic 
Party led by Kim Young Sam and the New Democratic Republican Party led by Kim 
Jong Pil. The three were merged into a Democratic Liberal Party (Minjadang), a 
conservative coalition clearly modeled on Japan’s long-ruling Liberal Democratic 
Party, and which left Kim Dae Jung’s Democratic Party small and isolated. This 
was similar to transformism (trasformismo) in Italy where in 1876, Agostino 
de Pretis, the new prime minister, invited the opposition Destra Party to shift 
to the government majority in exchange for personal beneﬁ ts, access to state 
patronage, and the right to local rule. The opposition parties, ﬁ nding themselves 
marginalized from power and state spoils, agreed and “transformed” themselves 
from the opposition into a stable part of the governing majority.15 Such Korean-
style transformism was seen by many civil society groups as a frontal attack on the 
consolidation of democracy in their country; consequently, civil society groups 
had no choice but to intensify their pro-democracy movement.
It was ironically the election of Kim Young Sam in 1992, the ﬁ rst genuinely 
civilian South Korean president in more than three decades, that provided the 
most serious challenge to civil society and mass mobilization in South Korea. 
Immediately following his inauguration and particularly in the ﬁ rst two years of 
his tenure, Kim designed and carried out a series of unprecedented political and 
socio-economic reforms, waging intensive anti-corruption campaigns, introducing 
a “real name” bank system, legislating political reform bills, and consolidating 
the civilian control of the military.16 Most of all, the Kim government’s effort to 
normalize relations with civil society was limited to not only pro-government or 
moderate groups but also radical groups in civil society. Kim’s soaring popularity 
left civil society groups, which had been so good at criticizing unpopular 
governments and so used to the repression by authoritarian regimes, bewildered, 
demobilized, and demoralized.17 In a word, civil society groups were no longer 
able to ﬁ nd a common target. Civil society and mass mobilization appeared largely 
irrelevant to South Korean politics. Civil society groups, which had weathered 
such harsh state repression during the previous authoritarian regimes, faced their 
most serious identity crisis under a democratic government.
Such seeming irrelevance of civil society and mass mobilization to South 
Korean politics and democracy, however, did not continue very long. Civil society 
groups remobilized themselves and have played an extremely signiﬁ cant role in 
the politics of democratic consolidation in South Korea during the Kim Young 
Sam government, by pressuring the government to break with the authoritarian 
past, protesting the possible erosion of democracy, and pursuing new movement 
causes such as environmentalism.18
What was particularly instrumental in the resurgence of mass mobilization 
in South Korea during the Kim Young Sam government was the nationwide 
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controversy during 1994–95 over one of the most difﬁ cult yet important issues 
of the consolidational politics – the “liquidation” of the authoritarian past. 
Democratic consolidation is “the process in which democracy becomes so broadly 
and profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very unlikely to break 
down.”19 Without a reasonably clean separation from the previous authoritarian 
regimes, it is nearly impossible for a new democratic regime to become “broadly 
and profoundly legitimate.” Therefore, how to deal with the authoritarian past 
becomes extremely crucial in either augmenting or undermining the legitimacy 
of a ﬂ edgling democracy.
The Kim Young Sam government was at best opportunistic regarding the 
issue of confronting and grappling with the authoritarian past. After a year-long 
investigation of the military putsch on December 12, 1979 and the Kwangju 
Massacre in May 1980, the government conﬁ rmed in October 1994 that Chun 
Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo were found to have engineered a military revolt. 
To the chagrin of most South Koreans, however, the Kim government announced 
in July 1995 that it would not pursue insurrection charges against Chun and Roh, 
because of the statute of limitations and to avoid damage to “national unity.” 
This announcement gave rise to a series of intense protests by many civil society 
groups, eventually leading to a national crisis. 
Beginning with a protest declaration by the Korea Council of Professors for 
Democratization (Min’gyohyŏp) on August 14, 1995, university professors waged 
a nationwide signature collection campaign to demand a special law for prosecuting 
the coup leaders.20 The disclosure of Roh Tae Woo’s corruption scandal by an 
opposition National Assemblyman in October 1995 dramatically escalated the 
level of mass mobilization. The “All-nation Emergency Committee on Enacting a 
Special Law for Punishing the Perpetrators of the May 18 Massacre,” established 
by 297 civil society groups, waged a signature collection campaign in which one 
million people participated. The Committee also held a “People’s Action Day” to 
call for the imprisonment of Roh, which 10,000 citizens and students attended.21 
Throughout November 1995, thousands of students, workers, movement activists, 
and ordinary citizens waged street demonstrations in Seoul and other major cities 
of the country.22 Yielding to the popular pressure that had engulfed the whole 
nation for several months, the government ﬁ nally prosecuted Chun and Roh in 
early 1996 on multiple charges of bribery, insurrection, and treason. Eventually, 
both Chun and Roh, on the recommendation of then president-elect Kim Dae 
Jung, were amnestied and released in December 1997. Nevertheless, the dramatic 
arrests and imprisonments of the two former general-turned-presidents, which 
had not been possible without the massive remobilization of civil society groups, 
immensely contributed to the consolidation of South Korean democracy by 
unequivocally demonstrating that a military coup would never be tolerated or 
justiﬁ ed as a viable option in South Korean politics.
Another high tide of civil society activism during the Kim Young Sam 
government came in late 1996. On December 26, 1996, the ruling New Korea 
Party (successor to the Democratic Liberal Party) passed several labor-related bills 
and a reform bill regarding the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, 
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Angibu; renamed National Intelligence Service, Kukka chŏngbowŏn, in January 
1999). These bills had been intensely debated and contested among South Koreans. 
Labor unions had opposed the proposed labor reform bills, because the bills, if 
legislated, would weaken labor unions and facilitate massive layoffs. Civil society 
groups had also disputed the proposed ANSP reform bill, because the bill would 
expand the investigative power of the already powerful state agency. Despite these 
concerns and criticisms from labor unions, civil society groups, and the opposition 
parties, the ruling party rammed the bills through the National Assembly, at 6 a.m. 
on December 26, clandestinely and without the presence of opposition legislators. 
This railroading of the controversial bills profoundly outraged civil society 
groups and led to a series of anti-government protests. Lawyers and university 
professors waged sit-ins and street demonstrations, demanding the immediate 
nulliﬁ cation of the bills passed. Student organizations, comparing the passage 
of the bills with the notorious legislation of two anti-democratic laws during the 
Chang Myŏn government in 1961, launched nationwide demonstrations. Labor 
unions characterized the Kim Young Sam government as a civilian dictatorship 
and led a series of strikes, including a successful general strike in January 1997, 
the ﬁ rst such strike since the Republic of Korea was founded in 1948. Catholic 
churches and organizations including the National Catholic Priests’ Corps for 
the Realization of Justice supported the student demonstrations and labor strikes. 
Buddhist and protestant organizations also joined the support.23 Well into mid-
March, massive demonstrations and signature collection campaigns by civil 
society groups and labor strikes created disruption throughout the country. The 
government was determined to remain uncompromising, yielding nothing to the 
pressure engendered by such mass mobilization. Despite this, the Kim Young 
Sam regime ultimately lost the battle. These anti-government protests irrevocably 
tarnished the regime’s previous democratic image, which, combined with the 
onset of a grave economic crisis in late 1997, made Kim Young Sam the most 
unpopular president in South Korean history.
Lastly, since the democratic transition in 1987, civil society groups in South 
Korea have explored and addressed new social issues. Particularly notable is 
the rapid expansion of the environmental movement in the 1990s. On April 2, 
1993, the Korea Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), the biggest 
environmental movement group in South Korean history, was created. The 
KFEM today has 49 regional ofﬁ ces and more than 80,000 dues-paying members, 
including many working journalists, lawyers, professors, religious leaders, 
medical doctors, nurses, social workers, artists, businesspersons, farmers, workers, 
students, and ordinary citizens. The leadership positions of the KFEM are ﬁ lled 
with the new urban middle class. The cadres or activists who carry out everyday 
duties of the organization are also highly educated and reform-oriented. Since its 
establishment, the KFEM has concentrated on a number of “focal projects” each 
year. Focal projects have included, for example, preserving clean water; reducing 
air pollution; increasing international solidarity in the anti-nuclear movement; 
expanding the membership and local organizations of the KFEM; enhancing 
environmental education; computerizing environmental information; waste 
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reduction; diversiﬁ cation of energy sources; promoting environment-friendly 
local politics; and educating children in environmentalism.24
The year 1997 proved a crucial year for South Korea. Beginning with the 
collapse of one of the chaebŏl groups, Hanbo, several big business conglomerates 
became insolvent and fell into court receivership. Foreign banks and investors 
pulled their funds out of South Korea, quickly leading to a foreign exchange crisis. 
Despite efforts by the government and the Bank of Korea, the exchange rate and 
stock market plummeted, placing South Korea virtually on the brink of defaulting 
on its foreign debt obligations. On December 3, 1997, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) agreed to provide a $57 billion package to South Korea, which was 
the largest in the IMF’s history at that time. Various conditions were attached to 
the loans, including stringent macro-economic policies, the restructuring of the 
ﬁ nancial and corporate sectors, and rapid capital and trade liberalization.25 Since 
the IMF bailout, South Korea, once touted as one of the “four little dragons” in 
East Asia, has been undergoing a serious economic restructuring.26
On the other hand, for the ﬁ rst time in South Korean history, an opposition 
candidate, Kim Dae Jung, was elected in the 1997 presidential elections. The 
fact that the opposition candidate could be elected conﬁ rmed that the presidential 
elections were unprecedentedly free and fair. The victory of the opposition was 
particularly historic because Kim Dae Jung had long been a strong supporter 
of democracy and human rights in South Korea.27 He had been one of the most 
progressive politicians in South Korean politics and, for that reason, had often 
been labeled and suppressed as a leftist or a communist sympathizer. More 
signiﬁ cantly, Kim Dae Jung was based in the Chŏlla region of southwestern 
Korea, a region that had been systematically discriminated against throughout 
the entire process of industrialization under the preceding authoritarian regimes.28 
His election to the presidency demonstrated that a genuinely horizontal transfer of 
power, an important indication of democratic consolidation, had ﬁ nally occurred 
in South Korea.29 
Civil society groups continued to play a pivotal role under the Kim Dae Jung 
regime. To some extent, the role of civil society and mass mobilization became 
even more salient and crucial, primarily due to the paralysis and immobilism 
prevalent within South Korea’s political society. From the day of his inauguration, 
Kim Dae Jung confronted bitter criticism and persistent hostility from the 
opposition Grand National Party. The National Assembly, throughout Kim Dae 
Jung’s tenure, was characterized by frequent verbal and physical confrontations, 
completely lacking all the vital signs and elements of a democratic and mature 
legislature – communication, partnership, cooperation, compromise, constructive 
engagement, civility, and so forth. With such a barren and dysfunctional political 
society, it was once again civil society groups and their mobilization that played 
crucial roles in setting important national agendas and pressuring the government 
to carry out reforms.
The activities of civil society groups during the Kim Dae Jung government 
primarily focused on social reform. That civil society organizations campaigned 
for social reform was hardly new in South Korea. However, the breadth and 
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vigor of the movement were notable. Civil society groups aimed at a complete 
transformation and rebirth of entire South Korean society, concurrently calling 
for political and economic reforms. In pushing for these various reforms, civil 
society groups also tried to formulate and present viable policy alternatives to the 
state, forging and nurturing a constructive engagement with the state.
First, mobilization of civil society groups was crucial in transforming the 
“election climate (sŏn’gŏ p’ungt’o)” of South Korea. The movement for fair 
elections, led by the Citizens’ Council for Fair Elections (Kongsŏnhyŏp), had 
contributed considerably to increasing the overall fairness of elections. However, 
civil society groups realized that ensuring fair elections would not fundamentally 
change the mentality and behavior of South Korean politicians. Hence, in 2000, 
they switched to a more aggressive movement to endorse and support speciﬁ c 
policies and candidates. On January 13, 2000, about three months before the 
National Assembly elections, 412 civil society groups, including the People’s 
Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD, Ch’amyŏ yŏndae) and the KFEM, 
established the Citizens’ Solidarity for the General Elections (CSGE, Ch’ongsŏn 
yŏndae). At its inauguration, this organization envisioned two different stages 
of its movement. The ﬁ rst was to generate a list of politicians who should not 
be nominated by political parties to run for the National Assembly elections (the 
Nakch’ ŏn movement). Second, if some of those “blacklisted” candidates were 
nominated anyway, the movement was to campaign against their actual elections 
(the Naksŏn movement).
On January 24, the CSGE disclosed a list of 66 politicians who should not be 
nominated as candidates for the April National Assembly elections. The selection 
criteria included involvement in previous bribery and corruption scandals, violation 
of the election laws, lack of legislative activities (e.g., too many absences in 
national assembly sessions), destruction of constitutional order (e.g., cooperation 
with Chun Doo Hwan’s authoritarian regime in the early 1980s or involvement 
in military coups), failure or refusal to sign anti-corruption laws, instigation of 
regionalism, and so on.30 Various faith-based organizations, including Episcopal, 
Catholic, Protestant, and Buddhist organizations, publicly expressed their support 
for the CSGE’s Nakch’ ŏn and Naksŏn campaign, stating that they completely 
endorsed the movement’s objective to expel corrupt politicians from the political 
arena and to restore the people’s right of political participation. Furthermore, 232 
members of Lawyers for Democracy (Minbyŏn) created a legal support team to 
give legal advice to the CSGE’s movement. Participating lawyers stated that the 
main goal of the Nakch’ŏn and Naksŏn movement was to protect and enhance 
people’s constitutional right of political participation.
The CSGE announced the ﬁ nal Naksŏn list of 86 unﬁ t candidates on April 3. 
The ﬁ nal list included 64 candidates who had been on the original Nakch’ŏn list 
but were nominated by parties and 22 more candidates selected according to the 
criteria of anti-human rights backgrounds, tax evasion, inappropriate remarks and 
behaviors in the national assembly, and so forth. In the national assembly elections 
held on April 13, 2000, 59 out of 86 candidates listed by the CSGE failed to be 
elected. In its disintegration ceremony one week after the elections, the CSGE 
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made the self-assessment that its Nakch’ŏn and Naksŏn movement, in which 975 
civil society groups and 1,000 activists participated in one way or another, had 
signiﬁ cantly contributed to the increase of voters’ political consciousness and 
efﬁ cacy, to the emergence of a new generation of young politicians, and to the 
partial revision of election laws.31
Second, many civil society groups during the Kim Dae Jung administration 
strongly demanded economic reforms, particularly reforms of the chaebŏl. It 
was a widely shared consensus among South Korean civil society groups that, 
in contrast with the signiﬁ cant progress in political democratization, there 
had not been any notable progress in economic democratization. Economic 
democratization had two dimensions: the ﬁ rst with respect to the overall market 
structure and the second with respect to the internal structure of companies. 
In terms of the overall market structure, scholars had long pointed out that the 
enormous power and inﬂ uence of chaebŏl groups had to be reduced to level the 
economic playing ﬁ eld for all economic actors. In terms of the second dimension, 
it had long been demanded that the internal structures of all major chaebŏl groups 
were too authoritarian, hindering managerial accountability and transparency.32 
These two issues of economic democratization became particularly prominent 
after the economic crisis in 1997, because it was believed that lack of progress in 
economic democratization was the essential cause of the crisis.33 
Civil society groups in South Korea, especially the PSPD, concentrated on 
the minority shareholders movement as a speciﬁ c method of achieving economic 
democratization. They used lawsuits and physical presence at shareholders’ 
general meetings to promote minority shareholders’ rights and to ﬁ ght against the 
dominance of chaebŏl owners – chairpersons and their families. On December 12, 
1997, the PSPD represented 100 minority shareholders of the First Bank (Che’il 
Bank) in a lawsuit to contest and annul a decision passed at the March 1997 
stockholders’ general meeting. The Seoul district court made a ruling in favor of 
the PSPD that it was unlawful for the Bank to ignore the right of expression of the 
minority shareholders and to proceed with revision of the statutes and election of 
the board members and auditors without voting.34 On March 4, 1998, the PSPD 
submitted a proposal to revise corporate statutes to appoint external auditors, 
strengthen the power of the board of directors, and prevent internal transfer of 
funds among chaebŏl companies of the same group.35 On September 10, 1998, 
the PSPD launched a campaign to acquire ownership of ten shares of stock of 
each of the ﬁ ve chaebŏl group companies: Samsung Electronics, SK Telecom, 
Daewoo, LG Semiconductors, and Hyundai Heavy Industry. After acquiring the 
stocks, the PSPD’s plan was to inquire about the responsibility of the management 
and to demand effective chaebŏl reform.36 Chang Ha Sŏng, a Korea University 
business professor and a leading member of the PSPD, ﬁ led class action suits 
against several chaebŏl companies on behalf of minority shareholders, charging 
them with mismanagement and abuse of power. Since 1999, the PSPD has been 
tenaciously leading a movement to hold economically powerful actors in South 
Korea more accountable to the law and the general public.
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In the sixteenth presidential elections held on December 19, 2002, South 
Korean voters elected Roh Moo Hyun as their new president. Roh, who had once 
been a labor lawyer and human rights activist, was a political novice compared 
with the three Kims (i.e., Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil) 
and other seasoned party politicians in South Korea. Born in 1946, he represented 
a new, younger, post-liberation generation. In his political career, Roh had 
displayed a stubborn maverick style – principled, consistent, and strongly 
supportive of political and economic reform. Since Roh’s election, progressives 
have entered the political establishment en masse. The successful entry of the 
Korea Democratic Labor Party into the National Assembly in the April 2004 
elections marked the culmination of the recent ascendance of progressives in 
South Korea. Now, progressives, who had spearheaded the pro-democracy 
movement during the 1980s, are in charge of designing and implementing various 
crucial democratic reforms. What has been taking place during the current Roh 
Moo Hyun government is the gradual but unmistakable shift of power from 
older and conservative to younger and progressive political actors. Government 
agencies, civil society groups, business ﬁ rms, and many major social institutions 
are increasingly occupied and operated by younger and progressive actors.
It is still too early to evaluate the role of civil society during the current Roh 
government of South Korea. But a few preliminary assessments seem possible and 
useful. Two elements have been conspicuous about the activities of civil society 
groups since 2003. First, civil society groups have been gradually expanding 
their issue area to include foreign policy and international relations. In 2003, for 
example, civil society groups waged intense nationwide protests against the Roh 
government’s decision to send South Korean soldiers to Iraq to help the United 
States. The anti-war movement was facilitated by a comprehensive alliance of 
diverse civil society groups, politicians (especially progressive legislators in the 
National Assembly), and even some public ofﬁ cials in the government agencies 
such as the National Human Rights Commission. Furthermore, in waging the 
anti-war campaign, civil society organizations also explored and employed 
new movement methods, such as one-person demonstrations, candlelight vigils, 
lawsuits, and cyber protests.
Another foreign policy issue that has brought about signiﬁ cant civic activism is 
the South Korean government’s agreement with the U.S. to relocate U.S. military 
bases in the cities north of Seoul such as Tongduch’ŏn and Ŭijŏngbu to those south 
of Seoul such as P’yŏngt’aek. On March 15, 2005, 606 residents in P’yŏngt’aek 
and 1,033 other citizens representing various civil society groups ﬁ led a lawsuit, 
arguing that the agreement between the Roh Moo Hyun government of South 
Korea and the Bush administration about the relocation and expansion of the 
U.S. military bases would seriously infringe upon their rights to ensure survival 
and pursue happiness and equality, as well as violating the Republic of Korea’s 
sovereign principle to refuse a war of aggression.37
During the past authoritarian period, it was possible for a small group of elites 
to design and implement foreign policy, completely insulated from the public 
purview. Foreign policymaking was characterized by secrecy, centralization, 
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top-down nature, and lack of transparency. Now, after the democratic transition, 
South Korea’s foreign policy is increasingly affected and determined by domestic 
politics. Because foreign policy is immensely consequential in affecting the 
daily lives of ordinary citizens, it is crucial to promote and institutionalize 
citizen participation in its making. Democracy is a political system that provides 
structures and procedures through which sensible foreign policies can be derived 
and pursued. In a democracy, elites and masses must jointly decide the goals, 
paths, and orientations of their foreign policies.38 In this regard, it is a natural 
and inevitable outcome of the country’s democratization that South Korean civil 
society groups are turning their attention to foreign policy issues.39
Second, civil society groups have challenged and opposed state-sponsored 
large-scale projects. Since 2001, for instance, major civil society groups including 
the KFEM and the PSPD have been waging protests against the government’s 
Saeman’gŭm reclamation project. The Saeman’gŭm project began in 1991 during 
the Roh Tae Woo administration to reclaim land and increase water supply in 
the Kunsan-Pu’an area, North Ch’olla Province. From the outset, however, 
the project has been intensely contested and challenged by a number of civil 
society organizations for the possible damage it would cause to the surrounding 
environment. In response to the protracted and ever-intensifying protest activities 
by civil society groups, the Seoul administrative court in the end decided on 
February 4, 2005 that the mega-project, with 85 percent of the construction 
already completed, should either be cancelled altogether or signiﬁ cantly changed 
due to its potential environmental, ecological, and ﬁ nancial harm to the region 
and the residents.40
Another state-sponsored mega-project that has been acutely contested, 
challenged, and opposed by civil society groups in South Korea is the plan to 
locate and build a nuclear waste dump site. When the county chief of Pu’an, North 
Ch’olla, without adequate consultation with residents, submitted an application to 
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy in July 2003 to invite a nuclear 
waste dump site, various environmental groups in the area and the vicinity 
launched an intensive anti-nuclear campaign against the action. Faced with a 
series of violent demonstrations by residents and environmental organizations, 
the plan to locate the nuclear waste site in Pu’an was completely abandoned. The 
Roh government instead pledged to make the policymaking more transparent and 
democratic, incorporating sufﬁ cient input from the local residents themselves. The 
site was ﬁ nally decided through a direct popular referendum in four competing 
cities in November 2005. As a result of the vote, Kyŏngju was selected as the site 
for a nuclear recycling center.41
Both the Saeman’gŭm and Pu’an incidents demonstrate that civil society groups 
in South Korea are now focusing their energy more on making the policymaking 
process more transparent and accessible. State-sponsored mega-projects, which in 
the past during the authoritarian regimes were carried out without any signiﬁ cant 
supervision by civil society, are now under the close surveillance and scrutiny 
of able and vigilant civil society groups and ordinary citizens. As a result, the 
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policymaking process in South Korea is becoming increasingly democratic and 
accountable.
Conclusion
As far as South Korea is concerned, the answer to the debate on elites vs. 
masses in the literature on democratization seems clear. As I have shown in 
this chapter, civil society and its mobilization were crucial in the democratic 
transition and consolidation of South Korea. Mass-ascendance characterized 
South Korea’s democratic transition. During the transition, it was the resurrection 
and remobilization of various civil society groups and their grand pro-democracy 
coalition with the opposition party that ultimately induced the authoritarian ruling 
regime to agree on a set of democratic reforms. In this respect, during what Rustow 
calls the “prolonged struggle,” critical choices were made among the mass public 
and in its interaction with elites.42
What is even more remarkable in the case of South Korea is the continued 
importance of civil society and mass mobilization in the period of democratic 
consolidation. It is generally agreed in the existing literature that civil society 
is demobilized – and therefore the role of civil society becomes signiﬁ cantly 
marginalized – in the consolidational phase.43 As Tarrow observes, “elite 
choices appear to predominate at the consolidation phase of newly emerging 
democracies.”44 But in the case of South Korea, even during the democratic 
consolidation, civil society and mass mobilization have played crucial roles in 
pressuring the democratic regimes to continue and deepen political, economic, 
and social reforms and to make the policymaking process more transparent and 
accessible. Civil society in South Korea, in brief, continues to serve as the main 
driving force for social transformation. In this regard, Dryzek’s observation is 
perfectly applicable to South Korea: “pressures for greater democracy almost 
always emanate from oppositional civil society, rarely or never from the state 
itself.”45 Therefore, in the epic of South Korean democratization, the elites rumble 
in the wings, if not actively sabotaging the whole drama; the actors on the stage 
are civil society groups and the mass public.46
In the last analysis, however, as Schmitter cautions us, civil society and its 
continued activism is “not an unmitigated blessing for democracy.”47 In one 
very crucial aspect, the fundamental political dynamics under both the previous 
Kim Dae Jung regime and the current Roh Moo Hyun regime are surprisingly 
similar to those under the previous authoritarian regimes. That is to say, political 
society is sharply dichotomized between the ruling and the opposition parties, 
entirely wanting in compromise, cooperation, civility, courtesy, and constructive 
interactions. Bypassing such a polarized and petriﬁ ed political society, the 
principal focus of politics continues to consist in the direct – sometimes conﬂ ictual, 
sometimes cooperative – interactions between the state and civil society. There is 
nothing intrinsically wrong with this close interaction and engagement between 
the state and civil society. However, if this direct engagement between the state 
and civil society keeps on circumventing and ultimately replaces party politics, 
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this may pose a threat to the consolidation of South Korean democracy. Virtually 
all the existing consolidated democracies in the contemporary world are predicated 
on the balance of two elements – vibrant civil society and functional political 
society. This balance between a strong civil society and a strong political society 
serves as an antidote to the abuse of power by the state. Therefore, as long as the 
imbalance between an energetic civil society and a lethargic political society drags 
on, South Korean democracy will be most likely to remain uninstitutionalized, 
unconsolidated, unstable, and fragile.
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